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FILED IN THE
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
Eastern District of Washington

APR 24 2001

JAMES R. LARSEN, CLERK
DEPUTY

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

10 ALFRED P. CHRISTOFFERSEN,)
11 WILLIAM J. GIBSON, RICHARD F.)
12 MAIN, and JOHN R. WARN,)

13 Plaintiffs,)

14 vs.)

15 WASHINGTON AIR NATIONAL)
16 GUARD, in its capacity as a Federal)
17 Agency, MAJOR GENERAL)
18 TIMOTHY J. LOWENBERG, as a)
19 Federally Recognized Adjutant General)
20 of Washington State, UNITED)
21 STATES AIR FORCE, a Department)
22 and Agency of the United States; and)
23 NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU, an)
24 Agency of the United States,)

25 Defendants.)
26

Case No. CS-01-0010-AAM

**PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF**

(Cause No. 81-02-03081-0, In the
Superior Court, State of Washington,
County of Spokane)

1 **1. Relief Requested.**

2 Plaintiffs request a summary judgment order declaring the Adjutant General of
3 the Washington National Guard is a federal agent for administration of the Federal
4 Technicians Program and having the authority delegated by Congress in 32 USC
5 §709(d), he is the “appropriate authority” to implement the Back Pay Act provisions of
6 5 USC §5596(b)(1).
7

8 **2. Standard Of Review.**

9 This action is filed under the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 USC §2201,
10 which reads in pertinent part:
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12 In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court
13 of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading,
14 may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
15 party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or
16 could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and
17 effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as
18 such. 28 USCA. § 2201(a) (1994) (emphasis added).

19 To establish standing, plaintiffs must demonstrate three elements. San Diego
20 County Gun Rights v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1996). First, plaintiffs must
21 have suffered an “injury-in-fact” to a legally protected interest that is both “concrete
22 and particularized” and “actual or imminent”. Id. Second, there must be a causal
23 connection between their injury and the conduct complained of. Id. Third, it must be
24 “likely” - not merely “speculative” - that their injury will be “redressed by a favorable
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1 decision.” Id. Additionally, plaintiffs seeking Declaratory relief only are also required
 2 to show a very significant possibility of future harm. Id.; see also Coral Const. Co. v.
 3 King County, 941 F.2d 910, 929 (9th Cir. 1991).
 4

5 As shown below, Plaintiffs have standing to request a declaration of their rights
 6 as they are effected by a federal agent’s interpretation of the Federal Back Pay Act.
 7 Because the issue does not involve any disputed material facts and it is one of law, the
 8 Court is asked to grant summary judgment as allowed by F.R.C.P. 56.
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10 **3. Issue Before The Court.**

11 Whether a State Adjutant General is the appropriate federal authority to make a
 12 determination of eligibility for an award of back pay to a Technician pursuant to 5 USC
 13 §5596? What is presently before the Court is an internal dispute between components
 14 of the United States Air Force, and its federal agent, the Washington Adjutant General.
 15 Unfortunately, Plaintiffs are caught in the middle. Plaintiffs do not ask this Court for
 16 money relief. They ask only who is right in the dispute because it effects pending State
 17 litigation.
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22 **4. Why The Case Is Before This Court.**

23 The simple legal issue before this Court has its genesis in a long legal struggle by
 24 four individuals who have been pushed from court to court, all with the statement that
 25 you may have been harmed, but there is no jurisdiction in this forum. The Court is
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1 asked to review the following lengthy factual recitation which highlights the
2 importance of the question being presented, the impact on the lives of each Plaintiff
3 and the ultimate effect on claims pending in the State litigation of Christoffersen et al.
4 v. State of Washington, et al., 1981-02-03081-0.
5

6 **4.1 Nature Of Case.**

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8 The case involves claims of four Air National Guard Technicians (Technicians
9 are federal employees) who were prematurely eliminated from their National Guard
10 positions in violation of a long-standing military regulation and rule allowing
11 Technicians to remain in National Guard service until age fifty-five (55) to qualify for
12 civil service retirement. A precondition to employment as a Technician is staying in
13 active service of a State National Guard. 32 USC §709(b). (Exhibit Nos. 6, 7, 8, and 9
14 of Affidavit of C. Matthew Andersen)
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18 In 1978, each Plaintiff was "involuntarily retired" from the Washington Air
19 National Guard, by the then Adjutant General of the State of Washington, MG Robert J.
20 Collins. Simultaneously they were terminated from their full time federal civil service
21 positions for the sole reason that they were no longer Guardsmen. (Sample termination
22 letter, Exhibit No. 1 to Affidavit of C. Matthew Andersen) To fire Plaintiffs,
23 MG Collins improperly interpreted a regulation, ANGR 36-06, and arbitrarily applied it
24 to terminate Plaintiffs' Guard and Federal Civil Service positions without **any** regard
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1 for their Technician status as required by the regulations. (ANGR 36-06, para.
2 10(e)(4), Exhibit No. 2 to Affidavit of C. Matthew Andersen)

3
4 Each Plaintiff was a high-ranking officer in the Washington Air National Guard
5 (WANG) and had exemplary service records. Each Plaintiff was also a highly rated
6 and qualified full-time Federal Civil Servant in the position of an Air National Guard
7 Technician (Technician). 32 USC §709.

8
9 A State Guard is responsive to the U.S. Departments of the Army and Air Force.
10 The National Guard Bureau (NGB) is a statutory bureau in the Department of Defense
11 with the sole purpose of channeling communications between the departments of the
12 Army and Air Force and the various State Guards. 10 USC § 3015. In 1977, the NGB
13 published a regulation whose purpose was compelling retirement of Guard officers with
14 more than twenty years service unless selected for retention by a Board of Officers.
15 This regulation is known as ANGR 36-06.

16
17 In 1978, WANG convened its first ANGR 36-06 Board. Each Appellant was
18 selected for retention. Without a stated reason, MG Collins chose to override the
19 decision on selection and "involuntarily retired" each Plaintiff. It is now res judicata
20 that the decision to fire was due to personal animus over an earlier incident.
21 MG Collins knew that his action would cause each Plaintiff to lose his federal
22 employment as a Technician by operation of law. 32 USC §709(3). The statement that
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1 MG Collins' actions were for personal animus has been proven before a military
2 administrative board. Each Plaintiff has now received a favorable ruling from the Air
3 Force Board for Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR), but this ruling did not
4 come until February 2000. The AFBCMR summarized the offending events as follows:
5

6 Sufficient relevant evidence has been presented to demonstrate the
7 existence of probable injustice. After reviewing all the evidence,
8 we are persuaded that the action to terminate the applicant's status
9 as a member of the Air National Guard, while not illegal, or
10 contrary to the governing regulation then in effect, was arbitrary.
11 We recognize that no member of the military may rely on
12 continued service based on performance alone. The needs of the
13 service, including such management policies as the "vitalization"
14 program, are often paramount consideration. The applicant's
15 status as a technician, however, placed him in a special category,
16 in that his continued military and civil service employment were
17 co-dependent. At the time he was considered by the Selective
18 Retention Board, the applicant had lengthy military and civilian
19 service, and it appears there was an intent, both by regulation and
20 policy, to give special consideration to technicians in this category,
21 i.e., that normally technicians would be permitted to remain in an
22 active military status until age 55. The evidence presented shows
23 that the member served honorably and performed his duties in a
24 superior manner. Therefore, he could reasonably expect to
25 continue to do so, at least until he reached age 55, unless some
26 self-evident need of the service intervened, or a "for cause"
separation was initiated. The applicant was considered by the
Selective Retention Board, in accordance with the regulations then
in effect, and the board found he met the regulatory criteria for
retention, and recommended his retention. *In our estimation, the
Adjutant General acted arbitrarily and capriciously when he
disapproved the Board's recommendation, without showing "just
cause" for the termination of the applicant's service and without
affording the applicant the special consideration cited in the*

1 *policy and regulation. We further find that the procedures then*
 2 *in effect were inequitable, since members such as the applicant*
 3 *could have their service terminated, without access to any appeal*
 4 *process.* Accordingly, in view of the foregoing, we believe that
 5 the applicant's records should be corrected, to the extent within the
 6 Secretary's authority under 10 USC §1552, by correcting the
 7 applicant's Federal military records in a manner which would
 8 place him in a position he would have held, but for the termination
 9 of his Air National Guard service. Since our authority does not
 10 extend to the applicant's civilian records, and we are otherwise
 11 constrained by laws pertaining to the retention of military
 12 members, continuation of the applicant until his mandatory
 13 separation date is the greatest relief possible under 10 USC §1552.

14 (See Exhibit No. 2 to Affidavit of C. Matthew Andersen for illustrative ruling that was
 15 entered as to all four Plaintiffs.)

16 The AFBCMR's rulings have now corrected the Plaintiffs' *military records* to
 17 show they were in the military for pay purposes to age 55. The AFBCMR does not
 18 have authority to correct the *civil service records* of the Plaintiffs. The ruling, did not
 19 address the loss of Plaintiffs' lifetime civil service annuity. These damages suffered by
 20 each Plaintiff remains to be tried in a pending Superior Court action.

21 **4.2 Course Of Proceedings.**

22 Plaintiffs originally filed an action in the U.S. Court of Claims relying upon
 23 Athas v. U.S., 597 F.2d 722 (Ct. Cl. 1979) which confirmed the Federal Court had
 24 jurisdiction of State Guard matters as well as the civil service claim. The Court of
 25 Claims accepted the argument of the federal government that it lacked jurisdiction and
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1 ruled on summary judgment, in Christoffersen v. U.S., 230 Ct.Cl. 998 (1982) that
2 National Guardsmen, not in active federal service, are State employees and as such they
3 have no relief in that Court. The court only addressed Plaintiffs' claims as Guardsmen
4 not as Federal Civil Servants. This jurisdictional ruling was a change in the law.
5

6 Plaintiffs then pursued a claim in the U.S. District Court. C-81-572-JLQ The
7 Defendants at that stage were the Washington State Air National Guard; the then
8 Adjutant General of the State of Washington, MG George Coates; MG Robert J.
9 Collins; and the Washington State Treasurer, Robert S. O'Brien. The State filed
10 motions for summary judgment to dismiss all claims of Plaintiffs for numerous reasons,
11 but specifically because of the United States Supreme Court decision in Chappell v.
12 Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983), setting forth the military non-intervention doctrine. This
13 likewise is a jurisdictional argument.
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18 **4.3 Disposition By U.S. District Trial Court.**

19 By Memorandum Opinion of March 21, 1984, Judge Quackenbush granted
20 summary judgment in favor of MG Collins, stating the doctrine in Chappell v. Wallace,
21 supra, precluded any **civil rights** action against a military commander and the action is
22 also barred by the military non-interference doctrine. Other motions resulted in
23 dismissal of the claims of Plaintiffs. A timely Notice of Appeal was filed to the Ninth
24 Circuit from the judgment on November 7, 1985.
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4.4 Ninth Circuit And AFBCMR Actions.

The Ninth Circuit denied the appeal of the four Plaintiffs on August 31, 1988. Christoffersen v. Washington State National Guard, 855 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir. 1988); cert denied - Christoffersen v. Collins, 490 U.S. 1098 (1989). Again, the Court focused on the claims as military members of the National Guard and not on the claims as Federal Civil Servants. However, in its opinion at page 1442, the Court offered that relief could be sought from the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records ("AFBCMR").

Application was then to the AFBCMR. It was not until September 2, 1992 that the Board rendered its initial opinion that MG Collins acted arbitrary.

The AFBCMR's finding would suggest complete relief to the Plaintiffs. However, initially, the AFBCMR stated it had only limited power to correct the *military* record to the date of mandatory retirement. The Board felt it had no authority to exceed mandatory retirement dates that would allow qualification for full civil service retirement at age 55. Without this relief, there was no waiver to grant full civil service annuity for the Plaintiffs. Thus, a hollow victory since the Board's ruling did not grant sufficient military service time to qualify for the civil service retirement.

On October 20, 1992, a request for reconsideration was filed with the AFBCMR citing the applicable legal authority authorizing the Board to grant relief. Unbelievably, the AFBCMR final ruling was not entered until February 22, 2000. This

1 ruling reinstated each Plaintiff to age 55. (See Exhibit No. 2 to Affidavit of C. Matthew
2 Andersen)

3 4 4.5 Superior Court Action.

5 When the Claims Court dismissed for jurisdictional reasons, lawsuits were filed
6 in both Federal District Court and Superior Court to pursue the claims. With
7 concurrence of the Superior Court, counsel agreed to stay the State action pending
8 resolution of the other matters. The State court action has been reactivated. The claims
9 are against (1) the State of Washington, (2) the State militia, Washington Air National
10 Guard, and (3) the position of Adjutant General of Washington State. The claims
11 pending are:

- 12 • Violation of the statutory separation procedure (RCW 38.12.170).
- 13 • Non-Retention was done in violation of plaintiffs' State due process rights
14 and was arbitrary and capricious.
- 15 • MG Collins acted in violation of the Air Force regulations he was empowered
16 to enforce.
- 17 • Plaintiffs were dismissed for an impermissible and unsupported reason under
18 the regulations.
- 19 • Violation of the plaintiffs' rights under Article 1, §§3 and 18 of the
20 Washington Constitution (due process and subordination of military power).
- 21 • Age discrimination in violation of RCW 49.60.
- 22 • Breach of contract and tortious interference with employment contract.

23
24 The case was scheduled to go to trial last fall. On the eve of trial, the State
25 removed the action, which was filed in CS-00-0216-WFN. In the removal the State
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1 asserted all of the State law claims are subsumed in the Federal Back Pay Act and
2 should not proceed. This declaratory judgment action was commenced to answer that
3 question. The removal was ultimately denied by Judge Nielsen for procedural reasons
4 and remanded to State Court. (Judge Nielsen's opinion is attached as Exhibit No. 3 to
5 Affidavit of C. Matthew Andersen.) The remand occurred after this suit was filed.
6 However, the issue is not resolved as the State intends to assert the Adjutant General's
7 authority under the Back Pay Act in State Court.
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11 **5. Uncontested Relevant Material Facts To Motion For Declaratory Relief.**
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13 The AFBCMR reinstated the Plaintiffs in their military capacity on February 22,
14 2000, awarding them military back pay and increased military retirement benefits to
15 age 55. Because the only basis for terminating their Federal Civilian Technician
16 positions (in 1978) was the loss of their military status, the Adjutant General of
17 Washington, as their federal employer has taken administrative action as a "*federal*
18 *agent*" to correct their civilian employment records. To affect this result, he has issued
19 the appropriate determination as allowed by the Back Pay Act. Plaintiffs' dismissal
20 was unwarranted, and provided commensurate relief for the loss of their civilian
21 positions in the form of back pay.
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1 Although Technicians are employees of the Department of the Air Force 32 USC
2 §709(3), the National Guard Bureau (NG) is the federal entity that disburses National
3 Guard funding, including that for Technicians. For reasons that have never been
4 articulated on the record, the National Guard refuses to honor the Adjutant General's
5 decision. The State advises that numerous efforts have been made to get a statement
6 from the federal government as to its legal authority to deny the relief. None has been
7 forthcoming.
8

9
10 The gravaman of the factual and legal argument advanced by the State is that the
11 Federal Back Pay Act exclusively controls the relief sought by Plaintiffs. The State
12 asserts as a result of the decision of the AFBCMR, and upon review of their federal
13 civilian employment records, the Adjutant General of Washington, as the Plaintiffs'
14 federal employer, determined that the Plaintiffs were entitled to an award under the
15 Back Pay Act, 5 USC §5596 (2000). The Washington National Guard processed the
16 award of back pay to the National Guard Bureau (Letter of March 21, 2000, Exhibit F
17 to Declaration of Jonathan T. McCoy), as the federal entity within the National Guard
18 structure responsible for the payment of such claims. On May 25, 2000, the
19 Washington National Guard received a memorandum (dated May 22, 2000) from
20 Colonel Howard W. Derrick, USAF, Deputy Chief, Financial Management and
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1 Comptroller of the National Guard Bureau returning the back pay claims “without
2 action.” (Exhibit G to Declaration of Jonathan T. McCoy).

3
4 It is the refusal of the National Guard Bureau to honor the Back Pay
5 determination of the Adjutant General of Washington that brings the matter before this
6 Court. The issue is proper application of Federal law, 5 USC §5596 (2000) and
7 5 C.F.R. Subpart H. (2000), and its interaction with 32 USC §709(f)(1)(A) (2000), the
8 statute that required the termination of the Plaintiffs upon their loss of federal
9 recognition.
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12 **6. Law And Points Of Authority.**

13 The real dispute before this Court is sub rosa and between the State of
14 Washington, acting as a federal agent and the federal government. Simply stated,
15 should the United States Air Force honor Major General Lowenberg’s Back Pay Act
16 decision to correct the Plaintiffs’ Air National Guard Technician records? The State’s
17 argument is straightforward and compelling on its face. It has never been reflected by
18 the federal government. In its simplest formulation the position of the State is:
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- 21 a. 32 USC §709(d) designates administration of the Technician
22 Program from the Secretary of the Air Force to the State Adjutant
23 General to “employ and administer the technicians.”
- 24 b. 5 USC §2302(c) makes the head of each agency responsible for
25 prevention of prohibited personnel activities and enforcement of the
26 civil services rules.

- c. 5 USC §5596(b)(1) grants back pay upon a finding by an "appropriate authority" of an unjustified and unwarranted personnel action.
- d. 5 C.F.R. §550.801 designates the "appropriate authority" as the one responsible for making written determinations of unjustified personnel actions and administering those Back Pay Act determinations.
- e. 5 C.F.R. §550.803 defines "appropriate authority" *inter alia*, to mean, "the head of the employing agency or ***another official of the employing agency to whom such authority is delegated.***"
- f. As the Federal delegate for administration of the Technician's Act, the Adjutant General has made the written finding required by the Back Pay Act to correct a past wrong.
- g. Despite the determination, the U.S. Air Force and National Guard Bureau refuse to comply with the Adjutant General's determination.
- h. The State may rely on the effect of the Back Pay Act to bar an action for damages by Plaintiffs in State Court.

6.1 Plaintiffs Have Standing Under The Declaratory Judgment Act.

Plaintiffs are in the middle. They have had to confront their dual status in every proceeding to date. Depending on the court, the Defendant will take the position that this is not my issue, you must pursue the other guy. The risk of this happening again has raised its head. To avoid future unnecessary delay in getting their day in court, Plaintiffs have asked this court to rule on the Back Pay question once and for all. There appears to be no legal authority directly on point. Thus, the issue is ripe for consideration by this Court.

1 Plaintiffs have legal standing to request relief from this Court. The criteria of
2 San Diego County Gun Rights v. Reno, supra. are clearly met in this case. Each
3 Plaintiff has been injured and lost not only their Federal Civil Service positions, but
4 their lifetime annuities as well. The AFBCMR makes uncontroverted the fact that the
5 actions of the Adjutant General were the causation of the injury suffered by Plaintiffs.
6 The last criteria, that a "favorable ruling" addressing their wrong is also present in this
7 case. A definitive ruling on the question of authority to act will address the wrong to
8 Plaintiffs, no matter what the outcome. Plaintiffs are fully entitled to receive recovery
9 for their loss of civilian pay and retirement. The State recognizes its obligation in this
10 regard. If this Court affirms that the Adjutant General may use the Federal Back Pay
11 Act for payment, then the issue goes out of the State case. If this Court rules the
12 mechanism for payment is not the Federal Back Pay Act, but rather damages from the
13 State of Washington, then the issue is decided at this time and it is not an issue for
14 appeal in the State case. Plaintiffs have no other vehicle to get this question timely and
15 properly addressed.

21
22 **6.2 The State Contends Federal Law Completely Preempts State**
23 **Law Issues.**

24 The need for resolution of the issue before the Court is real. The State has
25 asserted and continues to assert that the exclusive remedy for Plaintiffs lies under the
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1 Back Pay Act. The State reasons that Plaintiffs were federal employees of the
 2 Department of the Air Force. 32 USC §709(e).¹ They argue the question at bar
 3 exclusively involves their status as Federal Civilian Technicians. As various courts
 4 have noted, the fundamental purpose of the National Guard Technicians Act (32 USC
 5 §709) was to give federal employees status to Technicians, who, prior to 1968, were
 6 not deemed to be federal employees. Guarriello v. United States, 201 Ct. Cl. 129, 475
 7 F.2d. 640 (1973). (See Memorandum of Law filed by State in Removal Action,
 8 Exhibit No. 11 to Affidavit of C. Matthew Andersen.)

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 12 The State reasons that Federal law provides the exclusive remedy for relief of the
 13 nature requested by the Plaintiffs in this action with regard to their federal employment
 14 relying on Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 2416, 76 L.Ed.2d 648
 15 (1983); Saul v. U.S., 928 F.2d 829, 841 (9th Cir. 1991); Rivera v. United States, 924
 16 F.2d 948, 951-52 (9th Cir. 1991). They have asserted alternative forms of relief are
 17 unavailable. David v. United States, 820 F.2d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 1987) (intentional
 18 infliction of emotional distress); Lehman v. Morrissey, 779 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1985)
 19 (per curiam) (intentional infliction of emotional distress); Roth v. United States, 952
 20 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1991); Berrios v. Department of the Arm, 884 F.2d 28, 32 (1st Cir.

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 26 ¹ Formerly subsection (d).

1 1989) (defamation claims); Montplaisir v. Leighton, 875 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1989);
 2 Broughton -v. Courtney, 861 F.2d 639, 643 (11th Cir. 1988) ("If plaintiffs state law
 3 claims ... are within the scope of the coverage of the CSRA, then the actions are
 4 preempted by the CSRA.").

5
 6 In reliance on its position, the State concludes that Congress has "so completely
 7 preempted a particular area, that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims
 8 is necessarily federal in character", federal jurisdiction exists. Metropolitan Life Ins.
 9 Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1546, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987). Here,
 10 Congress has preempted the field. Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 63, 107 S.Ct. at 1546;
 11 Ethridge v. Harbor House Restaurant, 861 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir.1988).

12
 13 The State believes MG Lowenberg, based upon Federal law and long standing
 14 precedent, has exercised his authority in determining that Plaintiffs are entitled to back
 15 pay under 5 USC §5596 (2000), and 550 C.F.R. Subpart H (2000). State of Nebraska,
 16 Military Department, Office of the Adjutant General v. FLRA, 705 F.2d 945, 946 (8th
 17 Cir. 1983); New Jersey Air National Guard v. FLRA, 677 F.2d 276, 279-80 (3d Cir.
 18 1982) *cert. den.* American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local
 19 3486 v. New Jersey Air National Guard, 459 U.S. 988, 103 S.Ct. 343, 74 L.Ed.2d 384
 20 (1982).
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1 The U.S. Air Force refuses to acknowledge the Adjutant General's authority, if
 2 any, to make that determination as to Technicians, despite applicable Federal law (32
 3 USC §709) and the position the National Guard has taken in other litigation. See e.g.
 4 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau and Association of Civilian
 5 Technicians and Washington National Guard, et. al., 55 F.L.R.A. 657, 55 FLRA No.
 6 115, FLRA Rep. No. 946 (F.L.R.A. 1999).

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 9 If the State is correct in its position, then the State Court of Washington is not the
 10 proper forum to rule on the authority of the Adjutant General to reply on the Back Pay
 11 Act. The harm to Plaintiffs is that they will be forced to try this case to a jury, suffer an
 12 appeal and then face the prospect of a ruling by the State Court that jurisdictionally,
 13 they once again are in the wrong forum.
 14

15 16 **6.3 Declaratory Judgment Depends On Resolution Of A Substantial,** 17 **Disputed Federal Question.**

18 The question presented to the Court cannot be resolved without reference to the
 19 Federal laws surrounding the administration of the Back Pay Act. The Back Pay Act
 20 applies to Federal Civilian Technicians. Gnagy v. United States, 225 Ct. Cl. 242, 634
 21 F.2d 574 (1980); Athas v. United States, 220 Ct. Cl. 96, 597 F.2d 722 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
 22 The circumstances addressed by the previous Federal cases addressed only the *military*
 23 *status* of the Plaintiffs (rendering their claim nonjusticiable). That circumstance is no
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1 longer part of this case. The current question is whether Plaintiffs' civilian status
 2 permits the Adjutant General to use the Back Pay Act. The Plaintiffs are entitled to a
 3 declaration of the scope of authority of the Adjutant General on this question.
 4

5 **6.4 The Adjutant General Is The Federal Agent To Administer The**
 6 **Back Pay Act For Technicians.**


7 No party has disputed that Plaintiffs were harmed. No party disputes justice
 8 requires that Plaintiffs be compensated for their loss. The State wants the payment to
 9 be through the Technician program. The Back Pay Act regulations state the
 10 "appropriate authority" is the one delegated the responsibility for the program. The
 11 clear language of 32 USC §709(d) makes the Adjutant General a federal agent for the
 12 Technician's program. No legal authority has been located to refute the position of the
 13 State that the Adjutant General is in fact the "appropriate authority" to make the
 14 decision under the Back Pay Act. For that reason, the Court is asked to declare the
 15 scope of MG Lowenberg's authority under the Back Pay Act.
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20 The logic best supporting the State's conclusion is articulated by asking the
 21 question, "If the Adjutant General is not the appropriate authority as to Technicians,
 22 then who is?" There appearing to be no other answer than the Adjutant General, the
 23 Court is asked to enter judgment to this effect.
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7. **Conclusion.**

For the reasons stated, the Court is asked to enter a summary judgment order declaring that the Adjutant General is the "appropriate authority" under the Back Pay Act.

DATED this 24th day of April, 2001.


C. MATTHEW ANDERSEN
WINSTON & CASHATT
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be ☒ mailed, postage prepaid; ☐ sent via facsimile; ☐ hand-delivered, on this 24th day of April 2001 to:

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